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Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to critically examine the concept of ‘Politically 
Exposed Persons (PEPs)’ as provided under the Indian AML regime, particularly focussing 
on the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) guidelines to its supervised banks on dealing with the 
potential money laundering risks posed by PEPs.  
Design/Methodology/approach: The definition of PEPs as provided by international 
standard setters, and the concept as defined by the Indian AML regime was examined to 
examine the extend of the compliance of the Indian AML regime with the mandatory 
requirements of revised 2012 FATF recommendations and other international standards.  
Findings: The paper clearly establishes that the current AML regime of India does not fully 
comply with the mandatory requirements of the revised 2012 FATF recommendations, nor do 
the RBI guidelines provide any clear indications to its supervised banks on the effective 
development and implementation of AML PEPs controls. The paper argues that it is high 
time for India to increase its regulatory focus on the issue of PEPs and to expand its 
definition of PEPs by including both domestic PEPs and ‘close associates’ of PEPs within the 
definition.  
Originality: The paper demonstrates in an exceptional way that despite variations in the 
scope of the PEPs definition at international level, all the standard setters have included 
certain key individuals (both domestic and foreign PEPs as well as ‘close associates’ of 
PEPs) within the scope of the definition and how the legal and regulatory requirements in 
India are falling short of compliance even with these minimum key requirements. By 
adopting a step-by-step approach in critically examining the current legal and regulatory 
requirements enforced on banks in India to efficiently deal with the money laundering risks 
posed by PEPs, the paper makes a valuable contribution in highlighting the steps that might 
be taken to strengthen PEPs AML controls in India. 
Keywords: Money Laundering, politically exposed persons, , financial institutions, banks, 
Reserve Bank of India, PEPs 
INTRODUCTION 
In the Mutual Evaluation Report (MER) of India, which was adopted by the Financial Action 
Task Force (FATF) on 24 June 2010, it was reported that the preventive measures in place in 
India at that time to deal with the money laundering risks posed by Political Exposed Persons 
(PEPs) were inadequate and needed to be strengthened.1 In MER 2008, India was rated to be 
‘Partially Compliant (PC)’ with Recommendation 6 of the 2003 FATF Recommendations 
(hereinafter ‘old FATF Recommendations’). The major shortcomings in the Indian AML law 
                                                             
1 Financial Action Task Force (FATF), Mutual Evaluation Report Executive Summary: Anti-Money Laundering 
and Combating the Financing of Terrorism – India (25 June 2010). 































































and regulations were identified to be the lack of requirement by the Reserve Bank of India 
(RBI) circulars (a) to implement on-going risk management procedures for identifying PEPs, 
and (b) to apply enhanced measures to close relatives of PEPs.2  
Later, however, in the 8th Follow-up Report of India published in June 2013, which is a report 
on the progress made by India in implementing the AML measures and addressing the 
deficiencies identified in MER 2008, it was concluded that India has achieved sufficient level 
of compliance with old FATF Recommendation 6 by addressing nearly all the deficiencies 
earlier reported with regard to PEP provisions under Indian law.3 India’s current level of 
compliance was thus raised to be equivalent to ‘Largely Compliant (LC)’ with respect to PEP 
provisions. This was as a result of RBI’s circular issued on 9 June 2010 which required banks 
(a) to implement on-going risk management procedures for identifying PEPs and accounts for 
which a PEP may be the beneficial owner, and (b) to apply enhanced due diligence measures 
to close relatives (but not close associates) of PEPs.  
It is worth noting that the 8th Follow-up Report of India 2013 was based on the compliance of 
Indian AML law and regulations with the old FATF Recommendations. The FATF has 
significantly revised its provisions relating to PEPs in its 2012 revision (hereinafter ‘revised’ 
FATF Recommendations) and Recommendation 12 and 22 of the revised FATF 
Recommendations now deal with money laundering measures that should be applied to PEPs. 
Arguably, the revision of old FATF Recommendation 6 was mainly motivated by the desire 
to prevent grand corruption by public officials by making laundering of the criminal proceeds 
more difficult. In a joint paper published by the United Nations Office of Drug and Crime 
(UNODC) and the World Bank in 2007, it was estimated that the corrupt money received by 
public officials in developing and transition countries ranges from $20 billion to $40 billion 
per year – a figure equivalent to the annual GDP of the world’s 12 poorest countries.4 From 
the money laundering perspective, the issue of PEPs is arguably the most important point of 
intersection between anti-money laundering and anti-corruption efforts. Consequently, the 
provisions relating to PEPs in the revised FATF Recommendations were made stricter, 
requiring countries to implement an effective PEP regime (which complies with 
Recommendations 12 and 22) to enable them to efficiently identify these higher risk 
individuals and to better monitor their transactions, and thereby, to effectively combat any 
money laundering risks posed by PEPs.  
The revised FATF Recommendations were issued around fours years ago, in February 2012. 
After June 2013, India was removed from the FATF’s regular follow-up process.
5
 
Nonetheless, the country is still subject to the peer review ‘mutual evaluation’ process of the 
FATF where its compliance with FATF’s revised recommendations will be assessed. This 
paper examines the current level of compliance of Indian law and regulations with the revised 
                                                             
2 Ibid 17. 
3 FAFT, Mutual Evaluation of India: 8th Follow-Up Report (June 2013). 
4 UNODC and the World Bank, Stolen Asset Recovery (StAR) Initiative: Challenges, Opportunities and Action 
Plan. (The World Bank 2007). 
5 India was removed from the regular follow-up process in June 2013 on the grounds that it has achieved 
sufficient progress for all core and key FATF Recommendations. Till June 2013, India reported back seven 
times to FATF regarding its progress on the implementation and strengthening of its AML/CFT measures. 































































FATF Recommendations, with particular focus on PEPs, and makes a strong case for an 
amendment to the Indian AML regime to expand the definition of PEPs and for the issuance 
of clear guidelines by RBI on the concept of PEPs. The paper argues that such an amendment 
and actions are imperative not only to comply with the revised FATF Recommendations but 
also to mitigate the potential money laundering risks posed by domestic PEPs to the Indian 
economy, which arguably would be devastating and significant in light of the scale of grand 
corruption in India and the gross abuses of corrupt PEPs in the past few years.  
Overview of AML Framework in India 
The cornerstone of the relevant AML framework in India is the Prevention of Money 
Laundering Act 2002 (PMLA), which came into force on 1 July 2005. The most significant 
amendments that PMLA 2002 subsequently underwent were in 2009 (regarding the 
criminalisation of terrorist financing offence and extension of the list of predicate offences 
with cross-border implications) and in 2012 (regarding the expansion of the definition of 
money laundering to include cheating, concealment, acquisition, use and possession of 
proceeds of crime within its scope; and the requirement for Know Your Customer (KYC) 
obligations to include of ‘beneficial ownership’ during KYC measures for reporting entities).  
RBI is the authority responsible for supervising banking institutions and compliance with the 
legislative framework on the prevention and suppression of money laundering and terrorist 
financing (PMLA) by the institutions supervised by it. RBI regularly issues AML/CFT 
guidelines to banks and financial institutions (in the form of circulars) to prevent the Indian 
financial system from being used, intentionally or unintentionally, by criminal elements for 
laundering money or terrorist financing activities. 
RBI, in the context of its supervisory tasks, checks supervised institutions’ compliance with 
their AML/CFT-related obligations and assesses the adequacy and effectiveness of their 
AML/CFT procedures. It should be pointed out that the RBI has no power to conduct 
preliminary investigations or to examine in substance suspicious transaction reports 
submitted by supervised institutions. These powers are reserved to the Financial Intelligence 
Unit of India (FIU-India), the law enforcement or judicial authorities, as appropriate.  
FIU-India was established in November 2004 by the national government as the central 
national agency responsible for receiving, processing, analysing and disseminating 
information relating to suspicious financial transactions. FIU-India is also responsible for 
coordinating and strengthening efforts of national and international intelligence, investigation 
and enforcement agencies in pursuing global efforts against money laundering and related 
crimes. It is an independent body reporting directly to the Economic Intelligence Council 
(EIC) headed by the Finance Minister. 
PEPs: How the concept has been defined at International Level 
International standard setters agree that PEPs include natural persons who are or have been 
entrusted with prominent public functions. Sadly, however, despite this agreement, there is a 
lot of inconsistency in the terminology used and in the scope of the PEPs definition, as well 































































as the underlying requirements in the international standards, interpretive notes and 
methodologies. Some of the key inconsistencies that exist are highlighted in Table 1 below, 
which arguably have created a lot of confusion as to the concept of PEPs and thus hinder its 
effective implementation. 
Table 1: Definition of PEPs by different International Standard Setters and Regulatory Authorities 
International standard 





or foreign PEPs 
or both? 
Whether the definition includes 
‘close family’ or ‘close 
associates’ or both? 
Are there any other 
categories included in the 





foreign PEPs, but 
EDD measures are 
required for 
domestic PEPs 





Includes close family, but no 
limitation on the degree of 
relationship; for instance, 
immediate or extended family;  
Includes close associates, which 
means individuals who are closely 










Includes family members, but no 
limitation on the degree of 
relationship; for instance, 
immediate or extended family; 
Includes close associates but the 
term is defined to include both 
companies and natural persons.  
 




foreign PEPs.9  
Includes family members, but the 
definition focuses only on 
immediate family members (i.e., 
Includes deputy or assistant 
ministers; members of 
governing bodies of 
                                                             
6 The Old FATF Recommendations do not include ‘domestic PEPs’ within the definition of PEPs. The old 
FATF Recommendations ‘Glossary of Definitions used in the Methodology’ simply defines PEPs as 
‘individuals who are or have been entrusted with prominent public functions in a foreign country, for example 
Heads of State or of government, senior politicians, senior government, judicial or military officials, senior 
executives of state owned corporations, important political party officials. Business relationships with family 
members or close associates of PEPs involve reputational risks similar to those with PEPs themselves. The 
definition is not intended to cover middle ranking or more junior individuals in the foregoing categories.’  
7 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), United Nations Convention Against Corruption (New 
York 2004) Art. 52. 
8 Directive 2015/849 of 20 May 2015 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of 
money laundering or terrorist financing, amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council, and repealing Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and 
Commission Directive 2006/70/EC [2015] OJ L141/73. 
9 Under the 3rd EU Money Laundering Directive, the term PEPs has been defined to include both foreign and 
domestic PEPs, EDD measures were only required to be applied to foreign PEPs (See, Council Directive 































































spouse, children and their spouses, 
and parents of PEPs). 
Includes close associates, but only 
‘persons known to be close 




officers in armed forces; 
members of administrative, 
management and 
supervisory bodies of state-
owned enterprises; 
international organisation 
PEPs; members of courts of 
auditors or of the boards of 
central banks. 
The Wolfsberg Group11 Includes both 
domestic and 
foreign PEPs 
Includes close family members, 
but the definition focuses only on 
immediate family members (i.e., 
spouse, children, parents and 
siblings of PEPs). 
Includes close associates, but 
focuses particularly on PEP’s 
widely- and publicly-known close 
business colleagues and/or 
personal advisors, in particular, 
financial advisors or persons 
acting in a financial fiduciary 
capacity. 
Includes heads and senior 
officials in the armed 
forces, members of ruling 
royal families with 
governance responsibilities, 
senior executives of state-
owned enterprises and 
senior officials of major 
political parties. 





Does not use the terms ‘close 
family’ or ‘close associates’, but 
broadly includes close persons or 
companies clearly related to PEPs. 
 
 
It thus becomes apparent from Table 1 that the PEP provisions are not uniform in scope 
across standard setters and this might have arguably resulted in a lot of inconsistency 
regarding the concept of PEPs in the AML regimes of different jurisdictions. Nonetheless, 
one thing that becomes evident from the above analysis is that despite variations in the scope 
of the PEP definition, all the standard setters have included within the scope of the definition 
both domestic and foreign PEPs, requiring countries to ensure that their financial institutions 
consider PEPs to be high-risk customers and, accordingly, implement procedures for their 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
2005/60/EC of 26 October 2005 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money 
laundering and terrorist financing [2005] OJ L309/15). 
10 The term ‘persons known to be close associates’ has been defined under Art. 3(11) of the 4th EU Money 
Laundering Directive to mean: ‘(a) natural persons who are known to have joint beneficial ownership of legal 
entities or legal arrangements, or any other close business relations, with a politically exposed person;(b) natural 
persons who have sole beneficial ownership of a legal entity or legal arrangement which is known to have been 
set up for the de facto benefit of a politically exposed person.’ 
11  The Wolfsberg Group, Wolfsberg Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ’s) on Politically Exposed Person 
(“PEPs”) <http://www.wolfsberg-principles.com/pdf/faq/Wolfsberg_PEP_FAQs_(2008).pdf> accessed 25 
December 2015. 
12 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Customer Due Diligence for Banks (October 2001).  































































identification, with enhanced due diligence procedures at account opening, on-going 
monitoring and reporting of suspicious transactions. 
Even the revised FATF Recommendations require countries to have appropriate risk 
management systems in place to identify whether their customers or beneficial owners are 
foreign, domestic or international organisation PEPs. FATF recommendations require that for 
foreign PEPs, EDD measures must be applied, whereas for domestic and international 
organisation PEPs, the nature and extent of due diligence should depend upon the risk 
perceived by the bank in establishing a business relationship with such PEPs. In assessing its 
risk, the bank, for instance, should take into account the risk posed by the product, service or 
transaction sought, as well as other factors that have a bearing on money laundering and 
corruption risks. Where there is a higher risk, the AML/CFT approach should be stricter by 
accordingly, i.e., applying EDD measures even to domestic and international organisation 
PEPs. In addition, it has also been recommended by the revised FATF recommendations that 
the regulatory authorities of a country should provide appropriate guidance to banks in this 
regard.  
PEPs: How the concept is defined under the Indian AML regime 
In India, RBI defines PEPs as  
individuals who are or have been entrusted with prominent public functions in a 
foreign country e.g., Heads of States or of Governments, senior politicians, senior 
government/judicial/military officers, senior executives of state owned corporations, 
important political party officials etc. … [PEP] norms may also be applied to the 
accounts of the family members or close relatives of PEPs.13 
Arguably, the above RBI definition of PEPs clearly establishes two points: first, RBI did not 
go deep into the question of properly defining the scope of the concept of PEPs. This 
becomes apparent from the use of the word ‘etc.’ in the definition, which is a very broad 
expression with no clearly defined boundaries. It arguably creates uncertainty and ambiguity 
in the scope of the definition of PEPs and consequently impedes the effective development 
and implementation of PEPs provisions and controls in the jurisdiction. Secondly, by use of 
the wording ‘PEP norms may be applied to … the family members or close relatives of 
PEPs’, RBI suggests that it is left entirely to the discretion of the banks whether or not to 
apply EDD measures to the family members or close relatives of PEPs, which arguably does 
not fully comply with the revised FATF Recommendations, as these require financial 
institutions to apply similar EDD measures to PEPs, their family members and close 
associates.14 
                                                             
13 Reserve Bank of India (RBI), Master Circular – Know Your Customer (KYC) norms/Anti-Money Laundering 
Standards (AML)/ Combating of Financing of Terrorism (CFT)/Obligation of Banks under PMLA 2002 (Master 
Circular – DBOS.AML.BC.No. 24/14.01.001/2013-14, July 1, 2013), 8 
14  FATF, International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism and 
Proliferation (February 2012), Recommendation 12. 































































Moreover, in an RBI circular dated July 1, 2013, it was specifically stated that ‘if banks 
consider necessary, PEPs may be categorised as higher risk customers requiring higher level 
of monitoring.’15 Arguably, this wording appears to be giving discretion to the banks whether 
or not to consider PEPs as higher risk customers, depending upon the risk assessment of the 
customer after taking into account different factors. To the contrary, however, the FATF 
Recommendations, both old and revised, always designate PEPs as a special category of 
customers posing high risk for money laundering. Once the risk management system of the 
bank identifies a person to be a PEP, the FATF requires banks to always consider such 
individuals as high risk customers, which somehow contradicts the above wording of the RBI 
circular. Nevertheless, the same circular later provides that customers requiring higher due 
diligence include ‘politically exposed persons (PEPs) of foreign origin, customers who are 
close relatives of PEPs and accounts of which a PEP is the ultimate beneficial owner.’16 
Certainly, this wording is in compliance with the FATF Recommendations, but it is 
inconsistent with the former RBI approach where the banks have been given discretion to 
categorise PEPs as low-, medium- or high-risk customers. Such inconsistency in the 
guidelines of a regulatory and supervisory body clearly establishes the lack of regulatory 
focus and significance given to the issue of money laundering risks posed by PEPs in the 
jurisdiction. 
It is noteworthy that despite the lack of clear guidance by RBI to its supervised banks on the 
concept of PEPs, it, however, requires banks to subject PEPs to EDD measures by requiring 
them to obtain senior management approval not only for new PEP customers identified 
during account opening but also for existing customers that became a PEP. The banks are also 
required to take reasonable measures to establish the source of wealth, and conduct enhanced 
on-going monitoring of the business relationship with PEPs, the family members or close 
relatives (though not close associates) of PEPs, as well as the accounts of which PEP is the 
beneficial owner. 
Certainly, the RBI provisions relating to applying EDD measures to PEPs are in compliance 
with the FATF Recommendations. However, if we examine only the scope of the definition 
of PEPs as adopted by RBI, it can be argued that the definition, only to an extent, is in 
compliance with the old FATF Recommendation 6 (which also primarily focuses on foreign 
PEPs and recommends that countries apply EDD measures on foreign PEPs, with no clear 
guidelines on how to deal with domestic PEPs). This definition, however, does not comply 
with the revised FATF Recommendations (Recommendation 12 and 22), which require 
countries to make provisions for financial institutions to determine whether a customer or 
beneficial owner is a domestic PEP and in cases of a higher risk business relationship with 
such persons, financial institutions are required to apply additional measures consistent with 
those applicable to foreign PEPs. Moreover, no provision has been made under the Indian 
AML/CFT regime to deal with the potential money laundering risks posed by ‘close 
associates’ of PEPs, which is arguably a critical factor to prevent corruption. Even the term 
‘close relatives’, as it appears to be understood from the RBI circular, includes only 
                                                             
15 RBI (n 13) 8. 
16 ibid 10. 































































immediate family members of PEPs, i.e., wife, daughter, son and parents of PEPs,
17
 similar, 
to some extent, to what has been provided under the Wolfsberg Principles and the 4
th
 EU 
Money Laundering Directive, but limited only to the spouse, children and parents of a PEP. 
Nonetheless, considering the gravity of the problem associated with grand corruption and 
money laundering, the question now is whether India needs to expand its definition of PEP to 
include ‘close associates’ and ‘close family’ (both immediate and extended family) within the 
definition, which is answered in the affirmative by this paper, especially considering the scale 
of grand corruption in the jurisdictions (which is discussed below). 
Has RBI issued enough guidance to banks regarding PEPs? 
In addition to the lack of sufficient compliance of the current RBI guidance with the revised 
FATF Recommendations on the concept of ‘PEPs’, this paper argues that RBI has also not 
issued enough guidance to its supervised banks regarding PEPs, despite requiring them to 
identify PEPs and apply EDD measures to them. For instance, there has been no sufficient 
guidance provided by the RBI on the following crucial elements relevant to PEPs: 
• whether low-ranking officials and public place holders are to be included within the 
definition of PEP or only ‘senior’ officials;  
• whether the definition includes only ‘politicians’ or ‘government officials’ as well;  
• what the difference between ‘family members’ and ‘close relatives’ is, as used in the 
PEP definition; 
• what constitutes ‘close relatives’; and 
• if there is any timeframe for review of PEP status. 
In an AML survey conducted by KPMG in 2012 involving 100 financial institutions (mainly 
public sector banks, private sector banks, foreign banks, insurance companies and mutual 
funds) it was reported that only 77 per cent of financial institutions in India have specific 
procedures in place to identify PEPs (i.e., foreign PEPs).18 Although this figure appears to be 
encouraging, it does not lead to any definitive conclusions as to the compliance of the 
banking sector with the old FATF Recommendations on PEP provisions, for the survey 
includes only 45 banks as respondents. Moreover, compared to 80% respondents in North 
America and 77% of respondents in the Middle East and Africa, all of which recognise and 
distinguish between foreign and domestic PEPs, the recent KPMG Global AML survey 
reported that the Asia Pacific region, including India, lags far behind in the actual 
identification and monitoring of PEPs with only 51% respondents actually identifying and 
distinguishing between foreign and domestic PEPs to apply a risk-based approach.
19
 
Arguably, in the Indian context, this deficiency could be attributed to both the lack of a 
uniform definition of PEPs at the international level, as well as to the lack of sufficient 
                                                             
17 RBI (n 10) [2.4(g)] 
18  KPMG, India Anti-Money Laundering Survey 2010 < 
https://www.in.kpmg.com/SecureData/aci/Files/IndiaAntiMoneyLaunderingSurvey2012.pdf> accessed 25 
December 2015. 
19  KPMG, Global Anti-Money Laundering Survey < 
https://www.kpmg.com/KY/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/PublishingImages/global-anti-money-
laundering-survey-v3.pdf> accessed 15 December 2015. 































































guidance from RBI to its supervised institutions on the concept of PEPs, the effective 
implementation of AML measures relating to PEPs, as well as the adoption of a risk-based 
approach with regard to the level of due diligence to be performed on domestic PEPs when 
compared to foreign PEPs.  
Furthermore, there also appears to be a lack of regulatory sanctions imposed by RBI on banks 
for PEPs deficiencies. There has been no reported case in India where the banks have been 
sanctioned or faced any penalties for not effectively implementing PEP measures and 
controls, which arguably does not coincide with the KPMG 2012 survey where the majority 
of financial were reported as not conducting on-going monitoring of their business 
relationships with PEPs and almost a quarter did not have any specific procedures in place to 
identify PEPs. Interestingly, however, in the past two years, RBI has fined a number of banks 
for their general AML deficiencies, which reportedly does not include anything related to 
PEPs. These banks include, for instance, three major private banks (HDFC, Axis and ICICI – 
fined Rs. 4.5 crore, 5 crore and 1 crore, respectively in June 2013),
20
 three public banks 
(Dena Bank, Oriental Bank of Commerce, and Bank of Maharashtra – each fined Rs. 1.5 
crore for violation of KYC AML norms),
21
 and most recently, two co-operative banks 
(Krishna Mercantile Cooperative Bank (KMCB) and Khargone Nagrik Sahakari Bank 
(KNSB) – fined Rs. 5 lakh and Rs. 1 lakh, respectively in August 2015). 22  However, 
considering the risks posed by deficient AML controls applied by financial institutions in 
India, the IMF has rightly noted that ‘the sanctions that supervisors have applied for 
AML/CFT deficiencies in India cannot be considered to be effective, dissuasive or 
proportionate.’23  
Moreover, this study further argues that the lack of sanctions or penalties for any reported 
deficiencies in AML procedures relating to PEPs in the Indian banking sector could have 
been due to various reasons. First, it could be that the banking institutions have appropriate 
and effective PEP procedures in place, which arguably does not appear to be the case, as 
discussed above. Second, the lack of sanctions was potentially a result of PEPs being part of a 
bank’s wider AML system. Breaches of the PEP obligations were likely to be indicative of 
more fundamental problems with a bank’s defences and would result in sanctions for overall 
AML system failures rather than sanctions for PEP breaches. Third, the lack of PEP sanctions 
may be attributable, in part, to a lack of regulatory focus on PEPs. Arguably, if no sufficient 
guidance has been provided by the RBI itself to its supervised banks on the concept of PEPs, 
it would be difficult for it to monitor and require the banks to effectively implement AML-
                                                             
20 BS Reporter, ‘RBI fines Axis, HDFC & ICICI banks’ The Business Standard (New Delhi, 10 June 2013) < 
http://www.business-standard.com/article/finance/rbi-fines-axis-hdfc-icici-banks-113061000612_1.html> 
accessed 25 December 2015. 
21 Reporter, ‘KYC money laundering norms violation: RBI slaps Rs. 1.5 crore fine each on three public banks’ 
First Post (30 April 2015) < http://www.firstpost.com/business/kyc-money-laundering-norms-violation-rbi-
slaps-rs-1-5-cr-fine-each-on-3-public-banks-2219808.html> accessed 25 December 2015. 
22 NDTV, ‘RBI fines 2 Co-operative Banks under Anti-Money Laundering Rules’ NDTV Profit (27 August 
2015) < http://profit.ndtv.com/news/corporates/article-rbi-fines-2-co-operative-banks-under-anti-money-
laundering-rules-1211713> accessed 25 December 2015. 
23 International Monetary Fund (IMF), Financial Systems Stability Update (IMF Country Report No. 13/8, 
January 2013) 37. 































































related PEPs controls, which are not even clearly defined and explained in the RBI 
guidelines.  
Why the definition of PEPs should be expanded in India 
As argued earlier in this paper, in all the jurisdictions, it is critical for financial institutions to 
conduct greater scrutiny of business relationships with PEPs in order to deny corrupt PEPs 
access to the financial system and thereby address the potential corruption and money 
laundering risks associated with these customers. However, this becomes much more 
imperative for countries who have a strong background of grand corruption or misuse of 
public assets. Certainly, all PEPs are not corrupt, but it cannot be ignored that all PEPs are 
potentially in a position to abuse their positions for personal gain – no matter their country of 
origin (domestic or foreign PEPs), nature of business activities or seniority of position 
(‘senior’ or ‘low’ ranking public officials).  
According to the 2014 Transparency International Corruption Perception Index  (CPI), India 
had a 38 CPI score which indicates a medium to high degree of public sector corruption as 
perceived by business people and country analysts. The CPI score ranges between 100 (very 
clean) and 0 (highly corrupt). Corruption is a known phenomenon in the public sector in 
India, which is arguably evidenced by several scandals involving public officials in the past 
few years. For instance, there were allegations of gross misappropriation of funds (estimated 
to be $1.8 billion) at the 2010 Commonwealth Games, leading to the resignation of two 
senior political party members and other government officials. In 2008, an auditor’s report 
uncovered a massive Telecom Scam (widely known as the ‘2G Scam’) involving senior 
politicians, cabinet ministers and government officials, which was estimated to have costed 
the government nearly $39 billion, making it one of the biggest cases of grand corruption in 
India’s history.24 Charges under the PMLA were filed for this scandal and many major arrests 
were made. The Enforcement Directorate of India (EDI) claimed that the 2G scam’s money 
trail is linked to ten countries, clearly indicating the international ramifications of the case.25 
The argument of this paper is further supported by Global Financial Integrity (GFI) research, 
which places India as the decade’s eighth largest exporter of illicit capital, losing US$123 
billion in black money from 2001 to 2010.26 
Clearly, all these scandals involve domestic PEPs, which, arguably, in light of the country’s 
history of corruption and current scandals, should be included within the scope of the 
definition of PEPs. It is argued that banks, in compliance with the revised FATF 
Recommendations, should be required to adopt a risk-based approach in applying CDD 
measures to domestic PEPs and if there  a higher risk in establishing or continuing a business 
                                                             
24 ‘Punishing Corruption in India: Taking License Raja’ The Economist (Delhi, 18 November 2010) 
<http://www.economist.com/blogs/banyan/2010/11/punishing_corruption_india> accessed 25 December 2015. 
25 Reporter, ‘Money trail in 2G spectrum scam covers 10 countries: ED’ Times of India (8 December 2010) 
<http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Money-trail-in-2G-spectrum-scam-covers-10-countries-
ED/articleshow/7067801.cms> accessed 25 December 2015. 
26 C. Gascoigne and E.J. Fagan, ‘India loses US$ 1.6 billion in black money in 2010, loses US$ 123 billion from 
2001–2010’ (GFI Research, 17 December 2012) < http://www.gfintegrity.org/press-release/india-loses-us1-6-
billion-black-money-2010-loses-us123-billion-2001-2010/> accessed 25 December 2015.  































































relationship with domestic PEPs is perceived, EDD measures must also be applied to 
domestic PEPs.  
Similar to foreign PEPs, domestic PEPs are also in a position which they can easily exploit 
for their private profits, which then need to be laundered in different forms – for instance, by 
becoming the beneficial owner of a company, through their close associates, etc. – and thus, 
using the financial system to hide the origins of their illicit funds. Arguably, thus, there is no 
reason for distinguishing between foreign and domestic PEPs in India and for not applying 
similar EDD checks to the close associates of PEPs as well.  
Conclusion 
This paper clearly establishes that despite the revised FATF Recommendation relating to 
PEPs, including both the foreign and domestic PEPs within the scope of the PEP definition, 
no steps have been taken by the Indian jurisdiction to amend its current regulations to be in 
compliance with the revised FATF Recommendations. Arguably, the distinction made 
between foreign and domestic PEPs in India allows domestic PEPs, their close relatives and 
close associates to remain ‘off the book’ when there is no justifiable reason for making such a 
distinction – all PEPs (whether foreign or domestic) have an opportunity to misuse their 
position for personal gain and pose similar higher levels of risk for money laundering 
purposes. This paper argues that it is high time for India and RBI to issue proper guidelines 
on the concept of PEPs and to expand the definition of PEPs to include domestic PEPs and 
close associates of PEPs as well. It is argued that clear guidelines on the concept of PEPs 
need to be issued to banks so that the PEP regime in India can be made more effective and 
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